Did the Bank of Ghana Really “Lose” GH¢15.6bn — Or Is That the Wrong Question?

Core finding

The Bank of Ghana did record a GH¢15.63bn loss for 2025, deeper than the GH¢9.49bn loss in 2024. That part is factual. But the bigger story is not simply whether BoG “lost money.” The real question is whether the loss reflects policy failure, unavoidable stabilisation cost, accounting effects, or a deeper balance-sheet risk now being shifted back to the state.

What the documents show

BoG’s own financial statements show three important facts.

First, the Bank recorded negative equity of GH¢93.82bn, up from GH¢58.62bn in 2024. BoG links this to the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme and monetary policy operations in 2024 and 2025. Government has acknowledged an obligation to recapitalise the Bank over the medium term.

Second, BoG says it remained policy solvent, meaning it could still finance monetary operations from internally generated income. Its income from operations was GH¢22.23bn, while the cost of open market operations was GH¢16.73bn, leaving operating income after OMO costs of about GH¢5.5bn.

Third, OMO costs were real policy costs. BoG’s notes say open market operations cost GH¢16.73bn in 2025, mostly from interest on BoG bills and repo costs, and describe them as a monetary policy measure aimed at reducing inflation.

The stabilisation evidence

There is strong evidence that Ghana’s macro picture improved sharply. Inflation fell from 54.1% in December 2022 to 5.4% in December 2025, and Reuters reported that BoG cut its policy rate to 15.5% in January 2026 after cumulative cuts of 12.5 percentage points since July.

Ghana Statistical Service data showed inflation falling further to 3.2% in March 2026, the fifteenth straight monthly decline.

Reserves also improved. Reuters reported BoG had rebuilt foreign reserves to about four and a half months of import cover by October 2025, helped by GoldBod and gold-related reserve operations.

The fiscal context matters

The IMF reported that Ghana suffered major 2024 fiscal slippages before the election, with slippages of about 4% of GDP emerging and the end-2024 primary balance missing the programme target by 3.1% of GDP.

So the pro-BoG argument has a basis: monetary tightening and liquidity sterilisation were deployed in a difficult fiscal environment. But that does not automatically mean every cost was justified or cost-efficient.

ARN’s independent conclusion

The GH¢15.6bn loss should not be reported as a normal commercial loss. A central bank is not a company trying to maximise profit. But it also should not be dismissed as “nothing.” It is a public-sector balance-sheet event with future fiscal consequences.

The correct ARN framing is:

BoG did lose money in accounting terms. Some of that loss was the cost of stabilisation. But the more important question is whether Ghana has built a durable system where price stability no longer depends on expensive sterilisation, gold-backed reserve operations, and future government recapitalisation.

That is the story.

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