The Trucks That Ate the Trains — How Acheampong’s Road Revolution Killed Ghana’s Railways

I. From Colonial Tracks to Independence Dreams

Ghana’s railway network was once among the most advanced in West Africa. Built primarily by the British between 1898 and 1931, it connected the mineral-rich Western Region to Takoradi Port and extended northward to serve cocoa-growing areas. Railways moved more than 60% of Ghana’s exports by the early 1950s, according to the Gold Coast Railways Annual Report (1954).

At independence in 1957, President Kwame Nkrumah saw rail as the engine of industrialization — proposing new lines to the Volta Basin and northern frontier. Yet the vision collided with fiscal pressures and shifting global economics in the 1960s. By the time of Acheampong’s coup in 1972, the rails were already creaking.

II. Acheampong’s Asphalt Revolution

General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong came to power promising to rebuild Ghana’s economy through self-reliance. His flagship agricultural policy, Operation Feed Yourself (OFY), launched in 1972, sought to end food imports by linking farmers to markets. To achieve that, the regime prioritized roads over railways.

In December 1974, the government enacted NRCD 298, creating the Ghana Highway Authority (GHA) — a powerful institution under the Ministry of Works and Housing with direct budgetary control for road construction. That same year, Ghana officially switched to right-hand traffic under the “Operation Keep Right” campaign, synchronizing domestic transport with neighboring countries and symbolically reinforcing the shift to road-based mobility.

While the GHA’s budget expanded, the Ghana Railway Corporation saw cuts. According to records from the Ministry of Transport and Communications (1976), nearly 70% of public transport investment went to highway expansion, while rail maintenance received less than 10%. Acheampong’s administration, backed by state import licenses, also facilitated the purchase of commercial trucks — empowering private haulage operators and military-linked enterprises to dominate domestic freight.

III. When the Freight Left the Rails

By 1977, Ghana’s railway network had lost much of its freight base. Cocoa — once the backbone of rail cargo — moved increasingly by truck. The reasons were structural: trucks could reach new farming zones opened under OFY, while rail lines remained fixed to colonial routes.

At the same time, spare parts for locomotives were scarce due to currency shortages and import restrictions under Acheampong’s “Operation Feed Yourself, Feed the Nation” austerity. By 1978, only about 35% of Ghana’s rolling stock was operational (Ghana Railway Corporation Annual Report, 1978).

The regime’s populist policies — including controlled cocoa prices and subsidized fuel for state vehicles — further distorted the market, making road transport cheaper and politically favored. What appeared as efficiency was, in reality, a strategic sidelining of rail.

IV. The Human Cost of a Shift in Power

Beyond policy, the shift had human consequences. The once-thriving railway towns of Sekondi, Nsawam, and Tarkwa began to decline. Railway artisans — welders, fitters, and signalmen — lost steady jobs as workshops closed. Oral histories collected by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana (2004) describe “entire families migrating to roadside settlements” to seek work in trucking or construction.

By the early 1980s, Ghana’s railway network had effectively collapsed. The military government’s fall in 1978 and the subsequent instability of the Limann and Rawlings eras compounded the decline. Trucks became the new face of mobility — loud, visible, and politically connected.

V. A Legacy Paved in Asphalt

Acheampong’s road revolution left a paradox. He expanded Ghana’s domestic market reach and improved farm-to-market connectivity — genuine achievements in rural logistics. But by neglecting the railways, his regime ensured that Ghana would become road-dependent, with all the costs that came after: traffic congestion, road fatalities, fuel inefficiency, and expensive freight maintenance.

Today, more than four decades later, successive governments have tried — and largely failed — to revive the rails. The same roads that once symbolized modernity now carry the burden of decay. Ghana’s transport story remains an unfinished track.

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Sources & References:

1. Ghana Railway Corporation, Annual Reports (1970–1978).
2. National Redemption Council Decree (NRCD) 298, Ghana Highway Authority Act, 1974.
3. Acheampong, I. K., Operation Feed Yourself: Policy Statement, Ministry of Information, 1973.
4. Ministry of Transport and Communications, Transport Sector Review, Accra, 1976.
5. Konadu-Agyemang, K. (2001). Structural Adjustment Programs and the Decline of Rail Infrastructure in Ghana. African Development Review.
6. Songsore, J. (1989). The Urban Transition in Ghana: Urbanization, National Development and Inequality. University of Ghana.
7. Institute of African Studies, Oral Histories of the Ghana Railways Workers Union, 2004.
8. Ghana Highway Authority, Historical Profile and Legal Mandate, Accra, 1980.

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