
Ghana has changed not only its 5G policy, but the economic theory behind it.
Less than two years after choosing a single wholesale provider to build the country’s fifth-generation mobile network, the government has removed that company’s exclusive rights and opened the market to competition.
The National Communications Authority has invited applications for spectrum licences across the 700 MHz, 2.3 GHz and 3 GHz frequency bands. The eleven available spectrum lots carry combined reserve prices of at least US$230 million.
The size of the auction has attracted attention, but the policy reversal is more significant than the revenue it may generate.
For nearly two years, Ghana’s strategy rested on the belief that one shared national network could deliver 5G more efficiently than several competing operators. The current administration has reached a different conclusion.
It is now betting that competition will attract more investment, accelerate network deployment and create a more resilient telecommunications market.
Whether that decision succeeds will shape Ghana’s digital economy for much of the next decade.
Ghana’s first 5G strategy differed from the approach adopted in many other African markets.
Instead of assigning spectrum directly to mobile network operators, the government licensed Next-Gen InfraCo, commonly known as NGIC, to build and operate a nationwide wholesale 5G network.
Companies such as MTN Ghana, Telecel Ghana and AT Ghana would not initially build separate 5G networks of their own. They would purchase capacity from NGIC and use that infrastructure to provide services to customers.
The model was intended to reduce duplication.
Building several nationwide telecommunications networks is expensive. Towers, fibre connections, power systems, data infrastructure and radio equipment all require substantial capital.
A shared network, supporters argued, could lower infrastructure costs, improve coordination and extend coverage into areas that individual operators might consider commercially unattractive.
The proposal made Ghana an important test case for wholesale 5G infrastructure in Africa.
NGIC brought together Ghanaian and international technology partners.
The consortium included Radisys Corporation, a United States-based telecommunications technology company owned by Reliance Industries, the conglomerate controlled by Indian billionaire Mukesh Ambani.
Other partners associated with the project included Nokia, Tech Mahindra, K-Net, Ascend Digital and Ghanaian investors.
Ambani’s involvement helped draw international attention to the agreement, but the central issue was not the identity of one foreign investor.
It was the structure of the market.
By granting one operator exclusive wholesale rights, Ghana was placing the development of a strategic national communications network under a single licensed provider.
Supporters saw efficiency.
Critics saw concentration.
After the change of government, the Ministry of Communication, Digital Technology and Innovations reviewed the arrangement.
The new administration argued that exclusive control of national 5G infrastructure could weaken competition, limit innovation and slow investment.
In March 2026, the National Communications Authority formally notified NGIC that it intended to amend the company’s licence.
The regulator held meetings with NGIC, received formal objections from the company and conducted a hearing before its governing board.
On July 15, 2026, the NCA formally removed the exclusivity provision from NGIC’s wholesale electronic communications infrastructure licence.
NGIC was not closed down.
Its licence was not fully revoked.
Its existing spectrum assignment and other rights remained intact.
The amendment removed only the provision that made NGIC the sole wholesale 5G infrastructure provider in Ghana.
The distinction is important.
Ghana has not necessarily abandoned wholesale telecommunications infrastructure. It has abandoned an exclusive wholesale model.
The new approach allows several companies to participate in the market.
The government’s public case has focused on competition and the public interest, but the speed of NGIC’s deployment also became relevant.
According to information released by the NCA, NGIC had activated 49 5G sites by March 2026.
Forty-three were located in the Greater Accra Region.
The remaining sites were distributed across the Ashanti, Western, Northern, Bono and Central regions.
For a network intended to support nationwide 5G deployment, the number and geographic concentration of active sites raised questions about whether the exclusive model was expanding quickly enough.
The NCA has not described the licence amendment as a punishment.
Instead, the regulator says the change is intended to promote investment, innovation, network resilience, service quality and wider access to advanced communications services.
The central policy argument is that several competing providers may be more capable of expanding national coverage than one exclusive operator.
The NCA is offering eleven spectrum lots across three major frequency bands.
Three lots are available in the 700 MHz band, with each lot carrying a reserve price of US$36 million.
The 700 MHz band is particularly valuable because it can cover large geographic areas and penetrate buildings more effectively than higher-frequency spectrum.
It is therefore important for rural coverage, indoor connectivity and the expansion of mobile broadband beyond major cities.
Five lots are available in the 2.3 GHz band, each with a reserve price of US$10 million.
This band offers additional capacity for mobile broadband and is useful in densely populated areas where networks must serve large numbers of users.
Three lots are available in the 3 GHz band, with each lot carrying a reserve price of US$24 million.
The 3 GHz range is among the most important bands for modern 5G deployment.
It supports high-speed data, industrial connectivity, cloud applications, smart manufacturing and other services that require significant network capacity.
If all eleven lots are awarded at their reserve prices, the government could raise at least US$230 million.
The final amount may be higher if bidders compete above the minimum prices.
Spectrum is an invisible but finite national asset.
Mobile networks use radio frequencies to transmit voice, data and internet services. Because only a limited amount of spectrum is available, governments regulate and assign access to it.
The allocation of spectrum affects far more than government revenue.
It determines which companies can build networks, how much capacity they control and how competitive the telecommunications market becomes.
A poorly designed auction can strengthen an already dominant operator.
A well-designed auction can encourage new investment, improve coverage and create room for additional competitors.
This makes the rules surrounding the auction as important as the reserve prices.
The licensing process is not limited to Ghana’s three major mobile network operators.
Eligible applicants may include mobile network operators, broadband wireless access providers, internet service providers, mobile virtual network operators and qualifying new entrants.
The NCA framework also permits applications from eligible 100% Ghanaian-owned companies.
That provision could create opportunities for local investors and smaller telecommunications businesses.
However, acquiring spectrum is only one part of the challenge.
Successful bidders must also have enough capital to build towers, install equipment, connect sites to fibre networks, secure reliable power and maintain a national service.
The cost of deployment may therefore limit how many new entrants can compete effectively, even when the auction rules allow them to apply.
Much of the public attention will focus on MTN Ghana.
The company is the country’s largest telecommunications operator and holds a dominant position in the mobile data market.
Its financial strength, customer base and existing infrastructure could make it one of the strongest bidders.
That creates a regulatory dilemma.
The government wants experienced companies with enough capital to deploy 5G quickly. Yet awarding too much spectrum to the largest operator could further concentrate the market.
Telecel Ghana has previously argued that spectrum should not simply be awarded to the highest bidder if that process would strengthen an already dominant company.
The NCA must therefore balance three competing goals:
raising revenue, encouraging investment and preserving competition.
How it resolves that tension may be more important than the auction’s final value.
For Telecel Ghana and AT Ghana, the auction is both an opportunity and a financial test.
Direct access to 5G spectrum could allow both companies to develop their own network strategies instead of depending entirely on a single wholesale provider.
It may also help them compete more effectively with MTN in urban data services, fixed wireless internet and enterprise connectivity.
However, spectrum licences are expensive.
Winning a licence requires payment to the government, while deploying the network requires additional investment.
Smaller operators could therefore face pressure to choose carefully between bidding aggressively and preserving enough capital to build the infrastructure after winning.
An operator that spends heavily on spectrum but deploys slowly would not solve Ghana’s original problem.
The government’s new strategy rests on a familiar economic argument.
Competition can encourage companies to invest faster, improve service quality and develop new products.
When several operators control their own spectrum and infrastructure, each has an incentive to attract customers through better coverage, faster speeds and more reliable service.
The presence of multiple networks can also improve resilience.
If one provider suffers a technical failure, other networks may continue operating.
Competition may also reduce Ghana’s dependence on the decisions, finances or performance of a single infrastructure provider.
But competition also brings costs.
Multiple companies may duplicate towers, fibre networks and other infrastructure. Operators may focus first on wealthy urban markets while leaving rural communities behind.
The government must therefore ensure that competition does not produce several strong networks in Accra and Kumasi while leaving the rest of the country underserved.
The original wholesale model was not without logic.
Telecommunications infrastructure has characteristics of a natural monopoly.
Building a tower, fibre connection or transmission network once can sometimes be more efficient than allowing several companies to build similar infrastructure in the same location.
A wholesale operator can also be required to serve remote areas that commercial operators might otherwise avoid.
The weakness of such a model appears when exclusivity reduces pressure to perform.
If one company is the only authorised provider, operators and consumers have limited alternatives when deployment is slow or service quality disappoints.
The success of a wholesale network therefore depends heavily on governance, financing, regulatory enforcement and clear performance obligations.
Ghana’s experience suggests that the structure of the licence alone could not guarantee rapid nationwide deployment.
Consumers may expect competition to reduce prices, but cheaper mobile data is not guaranteed.
5G networks require substantial investment.
Operators must pay for spectrum, equipment, fibre connections, towers, power systems, maintenance and skilled personnel.
Those costs may initially limit price reductions.
The early benefits of 5G may appear through faster speeds, improved network capacity, stronger fixed wireless internet and better service in congested areas.
Prices may decline over time if operators compete aggressively and the number of users increases.
Much will also depend on taxes, electricity costs, device prices, foreign exchange conditions and the regulatory fees imposed on telecommunications companies.
The auction can create the conditions for competition.
It cannot, by itself, guarantee affordable internet.
The 700 MHz spectrum could help extend mobile broadband into rural Ghana, but spectrum ownership alone does not produce coverage.
Operators still need commercial incentives or regulatory obligations to build networks in areas with lower population density and lower consumer spending.
Without clear rollout conditions, companies may concentrate on Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and other urban centres where returns are faster.
The NCA will therefore need to attach measurable deployment requirements to the licences.
These could include regional coverage targets, deadlines for activating sites and penalties for operators that acquire spectrum without using it.
The success of the policy should be judged not only by auction revenue or urban download speeds, but by how widely the new networks are deployed.
The change in policy places greater responsibility on the National Communications Authority.
Under the exclusive model, the regulator primarily had to supervise one wholesale provider.
Under a competitive model, it must manage several operators, prevent anti-competitive behaviour, enforce rollout obligations and ensure efficient spectrum use.
It must also decide whether to impose limits on how much spectrum one company can acquire.
The regulator will need to prevent companies from buying spectrum mainly to block rivals or protect existing market positions.
It will also have to ensure that licence winners possess the financial and technical capacity to deploy the networks they promise.
The auction will therefore test not only telecom companies, but the strength of Ghana’s regulatory institutions.
The 5G reversal also reflects a broader change in government philosophy.
The previous administration believed a centralised wholesale network could deliver infrastructure more efficiently.
The current administration has placed greater confidence in market competition.
Policy reversals after elections are common, but they can create uncertainty for investors.
Companies considering large infrastructure projects need confidence that licences and agreements will survive changes in political leadership.
At the same time, governments have a responsibility to review arrangements that they believe no longer serve the public interest.
The challenge is to change policy through transparent legal processes rather than arbitrary political action.
In NGIC’s case, the NCA relied on provisions in the company’s licence and the Electronic Communications Act, issued a formal notice, received objections and held a hearing before amending the licence.
That procedure may matter as much to investors as the final decision.
International coverage has frequently described the former arrangement as a Mukesh Ambani-backed deal.
The description is accurate because Radisys, one of NGIC’s technology partners, is owned by Reliance Industries.
But Ambani’s role should not overshadow the Ghanaian policy debate.
This was not simply a dispute between Ghana and an Indian billionaire.
It was a disagreement over the structure of a national telecommunications market.
The central question was whether one wholesale provider should control the infrastructure through which other operators accessed 5G.
Reducing the story to one foreign investor risks missing the institutional and economic significance of the decision.
Several major African telecommunications markets have allowed mobile operators to acquire spectrum and deploy their own 5G networks.
South Africa has combined direct operator investment with infrastructure sharing.
Nigeria auctioned 3.5 GHz spectrum to licensed operators.
Kenya’s operators have also pursued 5G deployment through their own networks and commercial partnerships.
Ghana’s original model stood apart because it gave one wholesale company an exclusive role.
The new framework brings Ghana closer to the competitive approaches used elsewhere on the continent, although the final design will depend on licence conditions and the participation of new wholesale providers.
The comparison is important because Ghana is not developing 5G in isolation.
It is competing with other African economies for data centres, technology companies, cloud investment, fintech infrastructure and digital services.
Network quality increasingly influences where those investments are made.
For many consumers, 5G is presented as faster mobile internet.
Its wider economic importance is greater.
A reliable 5G network can support fixed wireless broadband, industrial automation, logistics systems, telemedicine, cloud services, connected agriculture and advanced financial technology.
It can improve connectivity for businesses that cannot easily access fibre networks.
It can also support data-intensive services in manufacturing, mining, transport and education.
However, these benefits depend on more than spectrum.
Ghana will also need affordable devices, reliable electricity, fibre infrastructure, local data centres, digital skills and clear technology regulation.
5G is an enabling platform, not an economic policy on its own.
The potential US$230 million in reserve revenue will be attractive to the government.
But maximising auction proceeds should not become the only objective.
High spectrum prices can reduce the money operators have available for network deployment.
If companies spend heavily to acquire licences, they may delay construction or pass costs on to consumers.
Governments must therefore balance short-term fiscal revenue against long-term economic value.
The greatest benefit of spectrum may not be the amount collected at auction.
It may be the investment, productivity and digital activity generated by the networks built afterwards.
A successful auction is not necessarily the one that raises the most money.
It is the one that produces the strongest market.
Several important questions remain unanswered.
It is not yet clear how many lots a single bidder will be permitted to acquire.
The regulator has not publicly resolved whether spectrum caps will be used to prevent excessive concentration.
The final rollout obligations attached to each licence will also be critical.
It remains unclear how quickly winning bidders must activate services, what regional coverage targets will apply and what penalties may be imposed for delays.
There is also uncertainty about whether new foreign investors will enter the market and whether Ghanaian-owned applicants will have enough capital to compete with established operators.
The answers will determine whether the auction creates genuine competition or simply redistributes spectrum among the existing market leaders.
The debate over Ghana’s 5G market reflects a wider question that governments face when building strategic infrastructure.
Some assets are more efficiently developed through a single coordinated network.
Others benefit from multiple competing providers.
Railways, electricity grids, water systems and telecommunications have all produced versions of this debate.
The previous administration concluded that 5G should be built through one exclusive wholesale provider.
The current administration believes several competing operators will deliver better results.
Neither position can be judged by theory alone.
The outcome will depend on deployment, investment, coverage, service quality and price.
The auction may settle who receives the spectrum.
It will not settle which economic model was right.
The government will be able to point to auction proceeds once licences are awarded.
Operators will announce network launches and coverage milestones.
But the more meaningful test will take longer.
Can rural communities gain access to reliable high-speed internet?
Can businesses obtain affordable broadband without depending on expensive fibre connections?
Can Telecel and AT Ghana compete more effectively?
Can the NCA prevent MTN’s existing dominance from becoming even stronger?
Can Ghana attract technology investment using better digital infrastructure?
And can operators build the networks quickly enough to justify the policy reversal?
Those questions will determine whether competition succeeds where exclusivity struggled.
Ghana has reopened the race to build its digital future.
The winners will not be determined only by who secures the spectrum.
They will be determined by who actually builds the network.