Why the Middle East Conflict Is Driving Fuel and Food Prices Up Across Africa

Ibrahim Zito
April 7, 2026
Global News

From fuel to fertilizer, the Middle East conflict is exposing the structural vulnerabilities of African economies — and testing whether the continent can absorb another external shock.

A shock transmitted, not declared

Africa is not a party to the Middle East conflict. But it is already absorbing its consequences.

What began as a geopolitical confrontation is now moving through global systems that Africa depends on — energy markets, fertilizer supply chains, shipping routes, and financial flows. The result is not immediate collapse, but a gradual tightening: higher prices, weaker currencies, and rising fiscal pressure.

A joint policy brief by the African Union, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the United Nations Development Programme projects that if the conflict extends beyond six months, Africa could lose at least 0.2 percentage points of GDP growth in 2026 .

That figure, on its own, appears modest. But in a continent still recovering below its pre-pandemic growth path, it represents something more significant: a system with limited capacity to absorb another external shock.

The cost-of-living crisis forming beneath the surface

The most immediate transmission channel is energy.

Oil prices have already risen by roughly 50 percent as of March 2026 , pushing up transport, electricity, and production costs across African economies. For countries that rely heavily on imported fuel, this translates directly into inflation.

But the more consequential risk may lie elsewhere.

Fertilizer — not oil — is emerging as the quieter pressure point.

Disruptions to Gulf liquefied natural gas supply affect the production of ammonia and urea, the key inputs for fertilizer. This matters because it intersects with Africa’s agricultural calendar. The March to May planting season depends on timely and affordable fertilizer supply. Any disruption at this stage does not just raise costs. It reduces output.

The implications are sequential and compounding: lower yields, tighter food supply, higher prices, and deeper food insecurity. In this sense, the conflict is not only an energy shock. It is a food system risk.

Trade exposure without control

Africa’s vulnerability is partly structural.

The Middle East accounts for 15.8 percent of Africa’s imports and 10.9 percent of its exports . More critically, global oil flows pass through chokepoints that sit far outside African control. The Strait of Hormuz alone handles roughly 20 percent of global oil exports.

When disruption occurs, Africa does not influence the system. It absorbs its consequences.

Shipping routes have already begun to adjust. Traffic rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope is increasing journey times and raising insurance and freight costs. These costs are not contained within the logistics sector. They cascade into food prices, industrial inputs, and ultimately household consumption.

Currencies, debt, and the tightening fiscal space

The second layer of the shock is financial.

Currencies in at least 29 African countries have depreciated , increasing the local cost of imports and amplifying external debt burdens. For governments already managing high debt service obligations, the effect is immediate: less fiscal room to respond.

Countries such as Senegal, Sudan, Cabo Verde, South Sudan, and The Gambia are identified as particularly exposed due to a combination of weak reserves, high import dependence, and constrained fiscal buffers.

This is where the pressure becomes systemic. Rising fuel and food costs increase public demand for intervention, but weaker currencies and tighter financing conditions reduce the government’s ability to respond. The result is a narrowing policy space at precisely the moment when it is most needed.

Uneven gains in a broadly negative landscape

There are, however, pockets of opportunity.

Higher oil prices could benefit exporters such as Nigeria, particularly as refining capacity expands through the Dangote refinery. Mozambique may gain renewed momentum in liquefied natural gas development. Ports in South Africa, Namibia, and Mauritius are experiencing increased activity as shipping routes shift. Kenya is positioning itself as a logistics hub, while Ethiopia’s national airline is strengthening its role as an intercontinental air bridge.

These developments illustrate an important point: shocks do not distribute evenly.

But the gains remain localized and insufficient to offset the broader inflationary and fiscal pressures facing the continent as a whole .

A geopolitical shift playing out on African ground

Beyond economics, the conflict is also reshaping geopolitical dynamics within Africa.

Competition for influence is intensifying among global powers, including the United States, China, Russia, Gulf states, Iran, and Türkiye. Fragile states such as Sudan, Somalia, and Libya are already experiencing the effects of external involvement, whether through security cooperation, resource competition, or strategic positioning along key trade routes.

At the same time, humanitarian and development financing may become more constrained. As donor priorities shift toward immediate crisis response closer to the conflict zone, Africa risks facing reduced access to already limited support.

This introduces a second-order risk: not just economic exposure, but strategic marginalisation.

From shock response to structural rethink

The policy response outlined in the joint brief is structured across three time horizons.

In the short term, the focus is on containment: securing fuel and food supply, stabilising currencies, and protecting vulnerable populations through targeted support measures.

In the medium term, the emphasis shifts to resilience. This includes strengthening regional supply chains through the African Continental Free Trade Area, expanding energy infrastructure, and building financial safety nets capable of absorbing future shocks.

But it is the long-term agenda that carries the most significance.

The brief calls for a move toward strategic autonomy: developing continental approaches to energy and fertilizer security, deepening domestic capital markets, and strengthening Africa’s collective voice in global economic and political negotiations.

At its core, this is not a response to a single conflict. It is a response to a pattern.

The underlying question

The Middle East conflict is not the first external shock to reverberate through African economies. It will not be the last.

What it reveals, with increasing clarity, is the extent to which Africa remains integrated into global systems that it does not control — and the cost of that position when disruption occurs.

The immediate challenge is to manage the current shock.

The deeper challenge is to reduce the need to absorb the next one.

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