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A US federal jury has convicted former Goldman Sachs investment banker Asante Kwaku Berko over a bribery and money laundering scheme connected to the development and financing of a power project in Ghana.
But the conviction has opened a much larger question in Ghana.
Where did the money go?
Evidence presented in the US case described major wire transfers, payments linked to Ghanaian public officials and institutions, foreign travel, coded communications and efforts to conceal the transactions.
A court-document summary reviewed by Africa Reporters Network describes a US$500,000 transfer in April 2015 and a second US$1.5 million transfer in May 2015.
The summary also contains an itemised list of alleged payments associated with institutions and groups including the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, GridCo personnel, Ministry of Power staff and Parliament.
The American case has now resulted in a conviction.
The Ghanaian side of the story remains far less settled.
Asante Kwaku Berko is a dual Ghanaian and US citizen who previously worked as an executive director in the Investment Banking Division of Goldman Sachs.
He was convicted by a federal jury in Brooklyn following a nine-day trial over a corruption scheme linked to a Ghanaian power project involving Turkish energy company Aksa Enerji Uretim A.S.
According to the reporting supplied to Africa Reporters Network, prosecutors argued that Berko and others sought to influence Ghanaian officials in order to secure approvals for the project.
The case involved allegations of foreign bribery, money laundering and efforts to conceal the payments from Goldman Sachs' internal compliance systems.
Berko was convicted on all counts presented at trial and faces sentencing.
His conviction, however, does not automatically establish criminal liability for Ghanaian officials mentioned or described in the evidence.
That distinction is important.
Berko’s involvement in the transaction began around late 2014, when Ghana was experiencing a severe electricity crisis.
The period became known nationally as dumsor, as households and businesses experienced prolonged and repeated power outages.
Government was under intense pressure to secure additional electricity generation.
It was within that environment that the Aksa power project was pursued.
The commercial stakes were high.
US authorities said the project was expected to generate hundreds of millions of dollars in profits.
That made regulatory approval, government support and parliamentary ratification extremely important.
According to the court-document summary reviewed by Africa Reporters Network, the first major transfer took place in April 2015.
The amount was:
US$500,000.
The summary describes it as the first bribe wire and says the money moved from Turkey toward Ghana through New York.
It was reportedly associated with what was described as Invoice 1.
The significance of this transaction is not simply its size.
It gives investigators a traceable financial event within the period when approvals for the Ghanaian power project were being pursued.
A second, much larger transfer followed in May 2015.
The amount:
US$1.5 million.
The court-document summary describes it as a second wire associated with Invoice 2.
It also states that the transfer occurred on the same day a senior Ghanaian official signed the deal.
That timing is important.
It does not, by itself, prove that the signing was caused by or exchanged for the payment.
But it creates a significant evidentiary question about what the transfer represented and where the funds ultimately went.
By August 2015, according to the court-document summary, an email connected to the transaction contained a breakdown of funds.
The alleged allocations included:
PURC — US$20,000
A named Ghanaian official — US$10,000
“MoP Girls” — US$20,000
“Power Team” — US$25,000
GridCo engineers — US$20,000
Parliament — US$30,000
Travel and visas for the Turkey trip — approximately US$45,000 to US$50,000
“Asante personal” — US$35,000
The document also describes payments of approximately US$5,000 each to about five Ghanaian officials who travelled to Turkey to inspect equipment, in addition to the cost of flights and accommodation.
A later US$140,000 reimbursement wire is also identified in the summary and is linked to one of the criminal counts.
These figures require careful interpretation.
An entry in an email does not automatically prove that every listed recipient received the amount shown.
But the list provides an important window into the structure prosecutors alleged was behind the scheme.
One line in the court-document summary is particularly significant.
According to the document, an August 2015 email stated:
“Parliament was all paid by Asante.”
The same email reportedly allocated US$30,000 to Parliament.
This matters because Ghana’s Parliament had ratified the Aksa power agreement in July 2015.
But the language must be treated carefully.
The statement does not identify which MPs were allegedly paid.
It does not establish how many parliamentarians may have been involved.
It does not prove that every intended recipient received money.
And it should not be used to accuse individual MPs without supporting evidence.
The legitimate question is broader:
Was any part of the parliamentary approval process improperly influenced?
The alleged payment list is notable because it appears to extend beyond elected politicians.
It includes references to:
PURC
GridCo engineers
Ministry of Power personnel
A “Power Team”
Parliament
If those descriptions accurately reflect the underlying evidence, prosecutors were examining an alleged influence network that touched several parts of Ghana’s power-sector decision-making structure.
That does not mean the institutions themselves participated in bribery.
Nor does an entry such as “PURC” prove that a specific employee received money.
What it suggests is that prosecutors believed influence was being sought at multiple stages of the project approval process.
US prosecutors also said the scheme involved an all-expenses-paid trip to Turkey for five Ghanaian officials who were taken to inspect equipment linked to the project.
According to the court-document summary, about US$5,000 each was also allegedly paid to approximately five officials, in addition to their travel and hotel costs.
Foreign travel is important in corruption investigations because inducements are not always delivered as direct cash payments.
They can take the form of hospitality, travel, reimbursements and benefits.
But once again, the identity of individuals and the exact purpose of each payment must be established before drawing conclusions about criminal responsibility.
The communications surrounding the transaction also contained unusual language.
According to prosecutors, a recipient was described as waiting for the “holy rain.”
The phrase was allegedly used as a reference to a bribe.
Another line contained in the document summary reportedly read:
“Kindly perform your magic.”
Such language is important because corruption schemes are rarely described openly in correspondence.
Investigators often rely on coded phrases, financial records, timing and surrounding communications to establish what a transaction was intended to achieve.
Prosecutors said Berko took steps to conceal the transaction from Goldman Sachs.
According to the case presented in the United States, Berko allegedly used personal email rather than his Goldman Sachs account when communicating about sensitive aspects of the deal.
He was also accused of providing misleading information to compliance personnel.
The alleged payments were said to have been disguised through mechanisms including:
shell companies,
sham invoices,
nominee account holders,
cash withdrawals,
and transactions moving through US and foreign accounts.
Goldman Sachs eventually withdrew from the transaction because of corruption concerns.
That raises another important Ghanaian question.
If Goldman Sachs identified serious enough concerns to walk away, what did Ghanaian institutions know at the time?
Berko’s conviction answers an important legal question.
A US jury has determined his criminal responsibility in the scheme.
But the evidence described during the case points repeatedly toward Ghanaian institutions and decision-makers.
That leaves a series of questions that remain relevant today.
Who ultimately received the funds transferred toward Ghana?
What happened to the US$500,000?
Where did the US$1.5 million go?
Who was represented by the term “Power Team”?
Who were the “MoP Girls” referred to in the email?
What did the US$20,000 associated with PURC represent?
Which GridCo personnel were being discussed?
What did the reference to US$30,000 for Parliament actually mean?
And what did the author of the correspondence mean by saying:
“Parliament was all paid by Asante”?
These questions are not evidence of guilt.
They are questions arising from evidence placed before a US federal court in a case that has now produced a conviction.
For Ghana, the significance of the Berko case reaches beyond one former investment banker.
The alleged scheme unfolded during a national electricity emergency.
It concerned a highly valuable power project.
It touched government approval processes.
It involved Parliament.
And according to prosecutors, it included transactions and communications designed to conceal payments.
More than a decade later, an American jury has delivered its verdict.
The challenge for Ghana is now different.
It is to establish what happened at the Ghanaian end of the money trail.
During dumsor, Ghana was waiting for electricity.
According to American prosecutors, someone was waiting for the “holy rain.”
The banker has been convicted.
The money trail still leads home.
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